Introduction
Decentralisation as a tool for devolving power from the centre to the periphery has gained traction across the global south over the last few decades (Manor 1999; European Commission 2007; Lambright 2011; McLaverty 2017) . While there are varying degrees of commitment and success, the main drivers of this growing recourse to decentralisation in the developing world are generally agreed to be: the growing need to apply participatory development approaches; the need for efficient delivery of basic social services; and the collapse of the centralised state of the 1980s (Boex and Yilmaz 2010 ; Diamond governments was most often recaptured by the centre due to loopholes, deliberately inserted in the decentralisation legislation. These loopholes included: provisions requiring ministry sign-off on budgets and annual plans; poorly trained local staff resulting in poor functioning of local authorities; poorly designed local institutions, militating against effective local decision-making; and the absence of an effective local political process to engender participation and accountability in the local governance process (Eaton et al. 20011; Wunsch 2001) . As a remedy, Wunsch suggested cautiously crafted legislation that embraces good practice -although stressing that this could lead to some further reassertion of central control over local authorities (Eaton et al. 2011 ).
Ghana's decentralisation efforts seem to fit well into this analytical framework. An Afrobarometer (2008) briefing paper on popular opinions on local governance in Ghana found that only 43% of Ghanaians realise that local government authorities are responsible for the statutory tasks specifically assigned to them. The other 57% believe that central government is responsible -including for services as basic as operating a health clinic. The report concludes: "It appears that popular understandings of local government functions remain steeped in Ghana's traditions of centralized public administration" (Afrobarometer 2008, p. 3) . This misconception is understandable, since a number of practices affecting local government suggest the reassertion of central control over local authorities. Examples are the continued appointment of district chief executives (DCEs) by the president, as opposed to their election; the appointment of 30% of local legislators by the president; issues with recruitment, placement and personnel management; constraints on revenue mobilisation and fiscal autonomy; and controls over development planning and implementation. Ayee (2008) has argued that, although Ghana has a comprehensive local government policy that dates back to 1988, in practice the country still runs as a Anaafo Review of local governance system of Ghana
CJLG December 2018
Page number not for citation purposes 3
highly centralised top-down public administrative political system. He even concludes that, where decentralisation is pursued, this is not as a tool for devolving power and improving socio-economic development, but rather as a means of realising "political objectives such as the recentralisation of power and legitimacy" (Ayee 2008, p. 243) .
Objectives and structure of the paper
This paper therefore explores the decentralisation system of Ghana to ascertain whether it is gaining strength, stalling or recentralising, by reviewing a number of legislative and administrative arrangements underpinning local governance in Ghana. Given Ghana's professed desire and enthusiasm to decentralise, however, any outcome of the analysis other than a relatively highly decentralised system will suggest recentralisation, as it will mean that all the reforms undertaken over the years are not achieving their goals. Following the introduction, the paper explains the study's methodology and analytical framework. It then provides an overview of the decentralisation journey of Ghana, beginning from 1988, followed by a theoretical discussion of the concepts of centralisation, decentralisation and recentralisation. The analytical framework is then used to examine the state of decentralisation in Ghana, with this discussion followed by concluding comments.
Study methods and analytical framework
This study is a politico-administrative review of the decentralisation trajectory of Ghana. The term 'politico-administrative' is used here to refer to the nexus between policy formulation and on-theground implementation mechanisms. The analysis is limited to the progress and state of decentralisation under Ghana's Fourth Republic, which came into existence with the promulgation of the 1992
Republican Constitution. However, as the decentralisation drive started in 1988, four clear years before the return to constitutional democracy in 1992, occasional references are made to developments during that period. The study reviews policy documents, decentralisation reform initiatives, relevant legislation and on-the-ground practices, involving appointments, recruitment, placement and management of local government personnel to examine whether Ghana is making strides in its decentralisation drive -or otherwise.
Analytically, the study uses the heuristic continuum developed by Hutchcroft (2001) based on his analysis of scholarly works on state formation and public administration. This continuum places full centralisation and full decentralisation at opposite extremes, although it is argued that neither of these 'pure' forms exist in the real world. However, it is possible to determine whether the governance system of a country is relatively more centralised or relatively more decentralised.
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Hutchcroft argues that a highly centralised political system will have an extensive combination of the following: He similarly argues that opposite characteristics will be true in a highly decentralised system.
Alternatively, Boex and Yilmaz (2010) have proposed six variables for assessing the state of decentralisation of governments, which are based on the technical and administrative dimensions of governance. Their framework identifies these variables as: political empowerment and decentralisation; administrative empowerment and decentralisation; fiscal empowerment and decentralisation; central government policy, legislation and institutions; local government institutions, management and administration; and civil society and the private sector. Eaton et al. (2011) have also proposed a range of (four) major variables regarding national and intergovernmental relations as an appropriate framework for the assessment of the effectiveness of different types of local government system. These include: the context and motivations underpinning decentralisation; the stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes; the stage of reform vis-à-vis the baseline situation; and the roles and motivations of external development partners.
As these propositions do not differ significantly from Hutchcroft's (2001) framework, this study has chosen to use Hutchcroft's analytical framework to examine the local governance system of Ghana.
The framework (see Figure 1) shows that it is possible for a country to transition from a highly centralised system of governance to a highly decentralised one -and vice versa. However, most countries operate more gradually, seeking to either decentralise or centralise government functions. The local governance system of Ghana 
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In principle, the decentralisation system of Ghana is characterised by the following: re-demarcation of various districts into smaller and more manageable local government units; non-partisan local government bodies; district assemblies mandated to perform legislative, administrative, development planning, service delivery, budgeting and rating functions; removal of obstacles to grassroots participation in the local governance processes; 30% of district assembly members appointed by the president in consultation with traditional rulers; a system of decentralised planning; and resource-and revenue-sharing between central and local governments (Government of Ghana 2016).
The country is divided into ten administrative regions, containing 216 MMDAs. These MMDAs are further sub-divided into 1,306 urban, zonal, town and area councils and 16,000 unit committees. Each of the ten regions is headed by a regional minister, appointed by the president and endorsed by parliament. The MMDAs are headed by DCEs, again appointed by the president but subject to a twothirds majority approval vote among members of the district assembly -the highest decision-making body at the local level.
According to Chireh (2009), Ghana's decentralisation system is underpinned by the following pillars:
• devolution of central government functions and authority to subnational government bodies;
• fusion of decentralised governmental departments and agencies at the subnational level into an integrated administrative system;
• reorganisation and restructuring of responsibilities, with greater implementation responsibilities resting on local government units; and
• active participation of various segments of the local population in local decision-making and implementation processes.
If Chireh's description is correct, it implies that Ghana is making significant efforts to deepen local governance: through devolving functions, ensuring that MMDAs have oversight responsibility over all decentralised governmental bodies, and providing opportunities for participatory governance at the grassroots level. Practically, however, there are various impediments to these processes, which are the subject of this research.
Defining centralisation, decentralisation and recentralisation
Governance can be simply understood as the organisation of human activities in space and time. From a historical perspective, however, it can be argued that the sole purpose of this has often been to make communities and the people residing therein governable and/or manipulable (Scott 1998) .
Centralisation, decentralisation and recentralisation are concepts used by governments in different ways to organise nation states and make them governable. Centralisation is defined by Besley and Coate (2003) as a system of governance whereby decisions over government expenditure are centrally made (Mann 1993, p. 55) . One way to achieve centralisation is through a system of prefectoralism: a governance system whereby the country is divided into various units, headed by prefects, who are expected to represent the central government, and who supervise all local-level actors (Hutchcroft 2001) .
Within the African context, Wunsch and Olowu (1990) and Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) have argued that most African countries are centrally governed, with a resulting lack of accountability, poor supervision and inadequate participation by the ordinary people in the governance processes. They emphasise that this ruler/ruled relationship also stifles dissenting views, resulting in flawed policy processes and errors of judgement in the overall governance processes. Whether this assessment is true of Ghana is subject to debate.
Decentralisation, by contrast, can be defined as "any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy" (Ribot 2001, p. v) . Three main forms of decentralisation are identified in the literature. According to Manor (1999) they are 1) deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, 2) fiscal decentralisation, and 3) political decentralisation, also sometimes termed democratic decentralisation or devolution. It is further suggested (Manor, 1999) that while it is possible for each of these forms of decentralisation to exist in isolation, it is equally possible to have a combination, or all three working together, within a given system. In deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, local branches of central government bodies are created to perform assigned tasks, but local officials remain accountable to their respective central ministries. Fiscal decentralisation, by contrast, entails the transfer of fiscal resources, revenue-generating powers and authority over budgets to local-level officials (who may be elected or appointed). Finally, devolution, the third and most complete form of decentralisation, entails the transfer of functions, powers and resources to independent and democratically elected subnational bodies (Manor 1999; Crawford 2004 ). This paper is particularly concerned with administrative decentralisation/deconcentration and political/democratic decentralisation/devolution, although occasional references are made to fiscal decentralisation.
Recentralisation has not been succinctly defined in the literature. In this study, however, it is perceived as a process whereby supposedly decentralised governmental structures are, covertly and/or overtly, recaptured by the centre through processes such as central government directives and administrative fiats. It is a process which deprives local-level actors of any initiative, by ensuring that they serve the interest of the centre as opposed to that of the local area. The result is that central government retains
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Current state of decentralisation in Ghana
Ghana's laws seek to establish a system of local governance. The key objectives of decentralisation, as contained in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana are: democratic participatory governance; effective and efficient service delivery; and rapid socio-economic development. These objectives were to be achieved through a combination of mechanisms: a political process of creating regional coordinating councils (RCCs), MMDAs and sub-district structures; an administrative process of transferring staff from central government ministries to local governments; fiscal decentralisation; decentralised planning, whereby
MMDAs become planning authorities; and the decentralised management of public-private partnerships.
Some 25 years after the Constitution's promulgation, it has become imperative to examine the extent to which the country is making progress -or otherwise -on the decentralisation journey. This paper therefore now discusses Ghana's current position, taking in turn the six relevant variables of Hutchcroft (2001).
To what extent are local and regional officials appointed or elected?
Of particular interest to this research is the method by which ministers and DCEs obtain their positions.
Regional ministers are appointed by the president and approved by parliament. The effect of this is that their loyalty is first and foremost to the president, who has the power to replace them without explanation. DCEs, on the other hand, although also appointed by the president, must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members forming their district assembly (the local legislature), present and voting. Interestingly, however, 30% of these members are also appointed by the president, which some critics assert is to ensure that his nominees attain the minimum votes required for their confirmation as However, successive governments have preferred to appoint rather than elect DCEs because it gives them some hold over local affairs. Beyond the appointment of DCEs and regional ministers, other provisions such as the appointment of 30% of the members of district assemblies and national control over the audit of local governments further deprive MMDAs of initiative and autonomy. The authors of this paper argue, however, with many other academics, that a functional local government system would more appropriately be given a "clear mandate, architecture, functions, and considerable discretion over the use of its funds and implementation" of initiatives (Ferrazzi 2006, p. 4 ).
There is a clear tension in Ghana's structures. While the 1992 Constitution, the Local Government Act 1993, and the Local Governance Act 2016 all support the creation of autonomous local government bodies, governments have managed to subvert this process, mostly by relying on the muted language (e.g. phrases such as 'as far as practicable') in which various sections of the legislation are couched (Ferrazzi 2006 announcements on noticeboards; and site visits. It must, however, be noted that participation is a broad concept which can take various forms. These have been summarised to include information-sharing, consultation, service access, input to programmes, election, representation, association and
collaboration (Institute of Local Government Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010).
In seeking to actualise the legal requirements, a number of rounds of local government elections have been held since 1988: in 1988/89, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 The issue of participation in local government in Ghana is also highlighted in the area of development planning. The National Development Planning (Systems) Act 1994 (Act 480) governs decentralised planning in Ghana. This is structured to comprise district planning authorities, RCCs, and sector agencies, departments and ministries -at the local, regional and national levels respectively -with the NDPC playing a supervisory role (Ayee 2008; Cobbinah and Korah 2016) . It is further suggested (Ayee 2008 ) that important features of the decentralised planning system include the requirement of public hearings for district, sub-district and local development plans; the preparation of sub-district plans and the definition of planning areas; and the creation of joint planning areas and special development areas.
Despite these provisions, however, Boamah et al. (2012) and Nunbogu (2014) report that planning in Ghana is still highly centralised and nationally oriented and does not provide adequate opportunities for community development and engagement. There is also a general lack of interest by the public in
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planning processes, and the requirement for public hearings is not adhered to by local authorities. In instances where hearings have been held at all, there has been little debate on the issues (Ayee 2008 ).
Participation of civil society organisations in local governance processes has not been any better.
Alongside the seeming lack of interest in public hearings by local governments, another problem is how they are conducted. They are susceptible to control and micro-management from the NDPC at the The local legislature is presided over by a presiding member, who must be a district assembly member, but who is voted in by other assembly members and must obtain two-thirds of the votes cast. Presiding members are elected for a period of two years, and are eligible for re-election. Presiding members chair
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and run general assembly meetings, have voting rights, chair the statutory public relations and complaints committee and also chair credit approval committee meetings (Government of Ghana 2016).
MPs represent the constituency and/or constituencies which are coterminous with their district in the national legislature. They are elected through universal adult suffrage from multi-party lists. They usually serve for a period of four years and may stand for re-election. MPs' functions include guiding the general assembly on new legislation; identifying local problems and advocating for their resolution in parliament; briefing the local assembly about proceedings of the national legislature; and providing feedback to their electorate on programmes/projects being implemented (Institute of Local Government and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010).
Assembly members are at the centre of the decentralisation process of Ghana. They are the link between the district assembly and the various communities or electoral areas that make up the district. They are elected or appointed for a term of four years, and are eligible for re-election/appointment. Assembly members are expected to participate actively in committee meetings of the assembly; disseminate government policies and programmes to the electorate; consult the electorate on major policy issues;
and articulate the views, concerns and interests of their electorate at assembly meetings (Government of Ghana 2016).
Of interest to this research is the extent to which the local legislatures (district assemblies) are independent of central government manipulation and directives. It is suggested that the constitutional provisions which empower the president to appoint both district chief executives and 30% of district assembly members are a sure-fire recipe for central government interference in, and control of local legislatures. These arrangements enable central government to push its agenda on local legislatures through subtle manoeuvring by the appointed district chief executives and assembly members. Ferrazzi (2006) even argues that by these arrangements the Constitution conceptualises the functions of local governments as emanating from central government -as opposed to from the local governments as the case should be.
Crawford (2004) chastises the local system of Ghana, arguing that the retention of presidential appointments and non-party-political local elections compromise essential democratic elements. He points out that the district assembly committee system is so organised that all sub-committees report to the assembly through the executive committee -which is chaired by the appointed district chief executive. The presiding member of the district assembly and the local MP(s) are not members.
Crawford also points out that while this may be seen as furthering the principle of separation of powers at the local level, the effect is to vest power in an appointed representative of the central government to the detriment of elected leaders. On this point, Ayee (2000) is of the view that, both practically and legally, the presiding member and the MP do not represent any effective counterbalance to the dominance of the district chief executives.
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The dominant influence of central government over local legislatures is further amplified by Section 6, sub-section 3 of the Local Governance Act 2016. This provision requires the president to appoint an interim management committee to oversee the functions of MMDAs whenever the Electoral Commission is unable to conduct district-level elections. Given that the Electoral Commission had to indefinitely postpone district-level elections in 2014 solely because of funding constraints, there is no guarantee that such scenarios may not be repeated in the future, and could serve as a convenient mechanism for the centre to usurp the powers of local governments. It would even be possible, in a 'worst case' scenario, for the centre to artificially create such a need.
Are local bosses capable of challenging the authority of the centre?
Turning to the fourth variable in Hutchcroft's (2001) analytical framework, in Ghana a number of constitutional provisions make it impossible for local bosses to challenge the authority of the centre. In While power is concentrated in the district chief executives, the president has the power to override them, cause their removal from office or use other discretionary powers to render them powerless;
implying a reconcentration of powers in the presidency. Also there are constitutional provisions that make it possible for the president to recapture or usurp these powers. Section 36 of the 2016 Act gives the president the power to cause the performance of any function of a district assembly to be investigated. Section 37, sub-section 1 goes further, stating:
The assemblies by an over-zealous president for personal or political interests, particularly in a politically charged environment like Ghana.
Nor is it only political power that has been concentrated at the centre. Development planning has also been centralised, and MMDAs can only plan based on the whims of central governmental bodies.
Section 86 To what extent is decision-making authority concentrated in the executive?
Leaving aside the question of centre-periphery relations, decision-making at the central government level does not in any way support Ghana's drive to decentralise. Instead, Ghana runs a quasi-executive system of government and, although the legislature and the judiciary are presumed to be independent, serving as checks on the executive, in practice several legislative, political and administrative structures combine to ensure that the executive remains a dominant force in decision-making processes. Simply put, decision-making authority at the capital is concentrated in the executive arm of government.
Constitutionally, the president is vested with wide-ranging powers and is therefore able to run government business however he/she deems fit. Wereko-Brobbey (2013) went so far as to refer to the powers of the president, as guaranteed by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as constitutional dictatorship.
It is certainly the case that Article 58 (1) Thus -bizarrely -it is impossible even for the people's representatives, MPs, to have a voice in matters as critical as the imposition of taxes and the utilisation of funds accruing to the state.
It is clear that these legal texts make the executive arm the fulcrum of central government decisionmaking. Certain legally-specified general administrative practices also contribute in no small way to fortifying executive power and influence. The president appoints all of the following: over 50% of cabinet ministers; the speaker of parliament; the chief justice and other justices of the superior courts; the commissioner for human rights and administrative justice; and a multiplicity of other roles engaged in national decision-making. It is true that it is impossible for the president to sack most of the people so appointed, as he/she is mandated to only do so in consultation with various stakeholders; nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that, once appointed to a position, individuals are expected to show support and/or loyalty to the appointing authority.
To what extent are local actors able to influence bureaucracies?
Finally, turning to the last variable in Hutchcroft's (2001) framework, within Ghana the recruitment, placement and transfer of civil and local government staff has been entirely centralised, with the Office of the Head of Civil Service responsible for the recruitment, placement and transfer of civil servants, and the local government service responsible for staff within its secretariat. This practice effectively takes away from local authorities the power to control any persons in the service of local governance.
It also contradicts constitutional provisions such as Article 240 (2)(d), and Article 37, sub-sections (1) and (2), which require the establishment of functional local governments, and mandates local authorities
to "have such staff as may be necessary for the proper and efficient performance of its functions".
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Ayee (2008) There is no doubt that current practice with regard to the recruitment, placement and transfer of local government staff does not give local authorities the discretion and authority they need to take action against non-performing officials. Local authorities are also rendered incapable of rationalising their staff to reflect their functions, geography, clients, administrative and technological needs.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the legislative, administrative and practical realities underpinning decentralisation in Ghana. It has established, using Hutchcroft's (2001) analytical framework, that practices at the local level are anything but decentralisation. While Ghana has solid principles for the decentralisation of government in a participatory manner, there exist significant deficits in implementation. On-the ground practices -legislative, administrative and political -indicate that the local government system in Ghana is controlled by forces at the centre. Local government officials, participatory processes, local legislatures and power structures have been so organised that the centre retains a dominant influence. Important functions such as development planning and making and approving by-laws have been recentralised through laws that require ministry or central government actor's sign-off before local measures can come into force.
The legislative and administrative structures of Ghana do not support the evolution of a genuine local government system -because legislative provisions stifle the emergence of a progressive local governance system, and administrative practices are manipulated by central government actors for partisan political goals. Although the Local Governance Act 2016 is touted as offering local governance in accordance with the Constitution of Ghana, (by establishing a local government service and a national system for development planning; by defining and regulating district assembly planning procedures;
and by coordinating, facilitating, monitoring and supervising district assembly internal audit activities), it is significantly challenged and limiting. The 2016 Act is a mere reorganisation of its predecessor, the 1993 Act. Substantial portions of the earlier Act have been reproduced verbatim, and it remains to be seen whether progress towards genuine devolution can be achieved. Finally, the unitary political structures in Ghana also make it difficult for districts to function effectively on their own, given the paucity of resources and support infrastructure in the regions.
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